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by Michael J. Graetz

Michael J. Graetz delivered the following remarks
at the Tax Policy Center’s
‘‘A Corporate Tax for the
21st Century’’ conference
on July 14 in Washington.
These remarks are substantially taken from his
April 2015 Ross Parsons
Lecture at the University
Michael J. Graetz
of Sydney Law School.
Graetz is an alumni professor of tax law at
Columbia Law School, professor emeritus with
Yale University, and the author of Follow the
Money: Essays on International Taxation.

W

e meet here today almost on the three-year anniversary of the OECD’s launching of its ‘‘Action
Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting’’ — or BEPS.
And we are only a few days after the meeting of the
OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs in Kyoto, Japan,
which included not only all members of the OECD
and the G-20, but also ‘‘Associates’’ from many developing countries around the world, in an effort to
implement the 15 Action Items of the final BEPS report. Eighty-four countries were represented there.
The BEPS project was different from any previous
multilateral effort on international taxation. What
makes it unique and historic is that it was generated,
promoted, received, and largely applauded at the Prime
Minister level of the G-20. This had never before happened with an OECD international tax project, and, as
a result, BEPS had to succeed — at least in the sense
that a moment had to come when the OECD declared
victory.
It is important to understand the linkage between
the efforts of the OECD — at the behest of the G-20
prime ministers — to curb multinational corporations’
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ability to avoid corporate tax and the recent vote in the
U.K. to leave the EU and the success to date of the
presidential campaign in the U.S. of Donald Trump.
Tax avoidance by multinational companies has
come to be seen by the public in the U.S. and throughout Europe as a prime symptom of the unfairness of
today’s global and technologically sophisticated
economy. As one key Australian tax official has put it,
multinational tax avoidance has become a topic of barbeque conversations. It is perceived as an important
symptom of a global economy gone wrong. Faced with
stagnating wages and long periods of under- and unemployment, middle income Americans and their
counterparts in the U.K. and elsewhere have become
fed up with headlines about how technology, pharmaceutical, and even retail firms can avoid taxes by moving their residence elsewhere, or the ownership of their
intellectual property, or their finance of operations, or
simply where to report their income by manipulating
intercompany prices. Members of Parliaments, Congress, and other politicians have found it easier to
demagogue these issues — or to adopt legislative distractions, such as the U.K. so-called diverted profits tax
— than to offer genuine solutions.
I do not mean here to minimize the difficulties,
when people in America or Europe believe their jobs:
and their incomes are being outsourced to Asia with
no adequate compensatory response, they become frustrated, even angry, and want to put up barriers both to
cheap labor from abroad and perhaps even to global
trade. International tax policy now finds itself caught
in these political whirlwinds. No longer is international
taxation going to be left to a priesthood of experts, to
quiet negotiations in the backroom.
This alone creates new challenges. The economics of
corporate and government decisions are complex. The
facts are often uncertain — or at least unknown to tax
authorities — and the stakes are often large: will a domestic company be able to compete on a level playing
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Bringing International Tax Policy Into the 21st Century

CURRENT & QUOTABLE

In making international tax policy, each nation must
take account of what other nations are doing and try
to anticipate how they might react to changes. The decline in corporate tax rates around the world and the
proliferation of so-called patent boxes suggests that —
although we tend to think of firms as competing —
nations are currently also engaged more in competition
than cooperation. The OECD’s BEPS effort may reverse that trend with regard to information production
and sharing, but not, I believe, with respect to the fundamental substantive rules governing international income taxation. But change now is remarkably rapid.
To borrow an image from Sting, making international
tax policy is like trying to ‘‘write on the surface of a
lake.’’ Before the ink dries on a new law or policy, conditions have changed. Choices being made by both
multinational businesses and national governments are
important, but very often quite temporary. New facts
surface and new laws follow. New laws are enacted
and the facts on which they were based are transformed.
Surprisingly, however, despite all the upheavals and
all the turmoil in global economics and politics, the
fundamental concepts of international taxation adopted
nearly a century ago retain their sway. We are governing today’s 21st-century high-tech, integrated, global
economy with a 20th-century international tax system.
The formative period ended in the late 1920s. By then
the United States, the U.K., and other countries had
adopted corporate income taxes, foreign tax credits or
exemptions for business income earned abroad to reduce or eliminate double taxation, and a system of bilateral income tax treaties. The key concepts, including
source rules, a requirement of ‘‘arm’s-length’’ pricing,
the permanent establishment concept, and nondiscrimination principles had come into place. Remarkably, the OECD’s recent BEPS effort challenged none
of these underlying principles. Rather, it simply attempted to ‘‘modernize’’ them. This modernization
project, however, was fraught with controversy. In Europe, countries generally wanted to strengthen their
source-based taxation. The Obama administration,
however, has been determined to strengthen its
residence-based taxation of U.S. multinationals. This
led a key U.S. Treasury negotiator to remark that when
he was participating in the OECD’s BEPS negotiations
he felt like everyone in the room wanted the U.S. to
pay for all the drinks.
The world of the first half of the 20th century,
which produced the key concepts, was a much simpler
place: there were no innovative financial instruments.
The residence of a corporation was generally fixed,
and it made little difference whether one looked to the
place of incorporation, the place of management and
control, the location of most jobs and assets, or the
residence of the companies’ shareholders to determine

316 • JULY 25, 2016

residence; all four typically gave the same answer. The
source of income was also usually clear. If one sourced
royalty income, for example, to the place where the
intellectual property is used, one had little difficulty
knowing where that was. Perhaps most importantly,
nations were either capital exporters (like the U.K. and
the U.S.) or capital importers (like France, Italy, and
Spain), so their interests were clear. Today, of course,
the interdependencies among the locations of specific
contributors to a multinational company’s total global
income undermine any clarity of the notion of source.
Knowing how to allocate such income among the nations — or entities — of production, consumption, asset ownership and deployment, financing, and/or management is inevitably contested and controversial. And
today, of course, virtually every country is both a capital importer and a capital exporter, which seriously
complicates its national interests. Despite all the
changes, however, the rules of the 1920s have remained
remarkably stable over time.
Beginning in the 1960s, led by the U.S., controlled
foreign company (CFC) rules came into existence and
spread throughout the OECD. Importantly, in the U.S.,
this signaled a strong effort to tax business income
based on residence — which reversed the idea in the
U.S. before that, which had regarded source-based
taxation as superior, at least for business income.
About 30 years ago, countries around the world began broadening their income tax bases and lowering
rates. In the business tax arena, this led to the internation competition and sophisticated tax planning by
multinational companies that we now live with. At the
same time, we have witnessed a technological revolution that allows information and money, and in some
cases products and services, to be moved around the
world with the click of a mouse; financial innovation
and engineering that, among other things, breaks down
the lines between debt and equity; a new aggressiveness
in tax minimization by large business entities; dramatically lower transportation costs; the emergence of important new economies especially in Eastern Europe
and Asia; huge growth and globalization of global
portfolio investment opportunities; and the ability of
business entities to amass large pools of capital without
going to the public capital markets through, for example, endowment funds, private equity, and sovereign
wealth funds.
Here, this last development has badly blurred the
line between pass-through entities, such as limited
liability companies and partnerships (which are not
taxed at the entity level) and taxable corporations. In
2012, only 54 percent of total U.S. business income
was reported on corporate income tax returns; 46 percent was reported on individual returns, most of which
was flowed through from partnerships, including very
large partnerships. This has seriously complicated the
ability to reform business income taxation in the U.S.
Finally, toward the end of last century and continuing now, in Europe, the European treaties have played
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field with foreign firms in third countries? Are domestic and foreign firms on the same footing in the domestic firm’s home country?

CURRENT & QUOTABLE

In sum, we have a 20th century international tax
regime trying to govern a 21st century global economy.
The critical question is: can that work? If not, what
will replace it? Attempting to address that difficult and
challenging question is, of course, the topic of today’s
conference. I am hoping that we make genuine progress.
Before concluding, however, let me offer a few observations about the future if we continue on the existing path. What can we expect from international tax
policy in a post-BEPS, ever-more-global economic
world? This, of course, brings us back to the challenges
of international income taxation with which I began. I
offer two quotes as a prelude to some predictions about
the future. The first is by Thomas Sewell Adams, an
economist who was by far the key U.S. person in fashioning the U.S. international tax law and the League of
Nations Model Treaty in the period from 1918 to 1928:
‘‘Anyone,’’ he said, ‘‘who trusts wholly to economics,
reason, and justice will in the end retire beaten and
disillusioned’’ in that ‘‘hard game’’ of tax law making.
The second, and perhaps more relevant quote, is from
Yogi Berra, who said: ‘‘It’s tough to make predictions,
especially about the future.’’
Nevertheless, here are a dozen.
First, BEPS will not usher in a new era of international cooperation, rather than competition, in international taxation. Nations will continue to compete —
especially for good jobs — and will offer low rates and
special tax breaks in an effort to get them. Not only
will R&D incentives and patent boxes survive and
thrive, but we will also see other incentives for domestic manufacturing and perhaps for specific industries or
products, such as green energy, and for headquarters
activity.
Second, each country — perhaps with the exception
of the U.S. — will try to shift taxes onto someone
else’s multinational companies and a wide variety of
so-called anti-abuse rules will proliferate. The U.K.’s
diverted profits tax proposal was just the beginning of
that process. Australia’s entry into that realm shows
that imitation and proliferation are likely. The very different efforts of large market countries, like India, offer
further confirmation of this trend.
Third, the need for revenue everywhere, along with
its political popularity, will combine to maintain the
corporate tax as a source of revenues in most non-taxhaven countries. So, we will see ongoing BEPS-type
efforts. The OECD will endeavor to provide the institutional home for those efforts. This is just the beginning.
The old slogan, ‘‘Don’t tax you, don’t tax me, tax the
fellow behind the tree’’ is becoming ‘‘Don’t tax you,
don’t tax me, tax the corporations across the sea.’’
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Fourth, multinationals around the world will engage
in ongoing, complex tax planning and will tend to stay
at least a step ahead of governments. This will create
more conflicts and opportunities for double or multiple
taxation of the same income, which, in turn, will produce new dispute resolution mechanisms and more
cooperation among tax administrators. As markets in
developing countries continue to grow, weak tax administrations will cause more and more difficulties for
multinational businesses.
Fifth, sooner or later a shift toward destination
based taxes, or at a minimum, a variety of backup
measures, perhaps in the form of minimum taxes, will
ease pressures on transfer pricing, which is hardly
going to be more rational or certain after BEPS than
before. Formulas and ex post profit splits will become
more important over time. In large market countries,
these will be based largely on sales; in high export
countries, on production.
Sixth, the BEPS effort to link tax consequences to
the location of ‘‘real’’ ‘‘value enhancing’’ activity will
introduce greater distortions than now exist into firms’
decisions about where to locate real activities, such as
personnel and plant and equipment. As an example of
what I mean, take the U.S. case of corporate inversions. In the old days, you could put a foreign parent
on top of a U.S. multinational through a purely paper
transaction — and move the parent to Bermuda, for
example. Now, you have to move real activities, so recent inversions of U.S. companies have been into real
countries like Canada, the U.K., and the Netherlands.
The U.S. was probably better off when only paper had
to move.
Seventh, the complexities of arrangements and multiple avenues for tax reduction imply that countries are
going to rely more and more on general anti-avoidance
rules or overriding economic substance requirements to
challenge tax planning and transactions. This is already
happening in the U.S. and elsewhere. The limits of that
approach will be severely tested through litigation in
the years ahead.
Eighth, the increasing needs for revenues from
destination-based consumption taxes — from GSTs
and VATs — will mean that more and more countries
will try to make their VATs look more like New Zealand’s GST, with varying degrees of success. This will
put more and more pressure on taxing international
services, which already is causing major headaches.
Europe will be slow to make changes because of treaty
barriers. Freedom from those barriers may be one benefit of the Brexit for the U.K.
Ninth, countries will look to tax or otherwise obtain
revenues from location-specific activities, especially
natural resources, tourism, the use of deep water ports,
and the like. They will have to be very careful not to
overdo it.

JULY 25, 2016 • 317

For more copy
Tax Notes
International
please visit www.taxnotes.com.
Electronic
available
at: content,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2819151

(C) Tax Analysts 2016. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

a major role in shaping international tax policies, for
example, in the arenas of CFC and thin capitalization
rules, and in dismantling European imputation systems.
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Eleventh, countries will search for new sources of
taxation. Excise taxes may make a comeback, espe-
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cially on financial institutions or certain financial transactions and perhaps on fossil fuel consumption.
Twelfth, and finally, people like us — who have
made or will make tax planning, tax policy, or tax
compliance their vocation — have nothing to worry
about. Business of all sorts will long be robust. BEPS
is closer to the beginning of this story than the end.
Of course, the only one of these predictions that I’m
certain about is the last. Thank you.
◆
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Tenth, because of concerns with inequality, there
will be greater efforts to tax individuals’ capital income. Archaic exemptions for capital gains, for example, will erode and ultimately disappear. And the
need to tax capital income to address inequality will
make it impossible for developed countries to jettison
their corporate income taxes.

